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As the planning for South America’s largest natural gas project, the Camisea Project, in Peru
progressed, meanwhile at over fifty universities in the United States students were holding demon-
strations to protest the involvement of Citigroup, the commercial and investment bank, in this and
other infrastructure projects. Natural gas extraction and distribution was a surprising lightning rod
for non-violent action. However, perhaps the alleged potential negative impact of the project on
the rainforest and indigenous groups of the region goes some way to explain things. Such protests
were a part of a larger movement to target public and private financial institutions involved in
financing infrastructure projects. This and other protests targeting the Camisea Project have suc-
ceeded in eliciting concessions and policy changes by the major players who underwrite and par-
ticipate in the project. However, despite successes and mutual agreements between protesters and
project planners about how an infrastructure project should be carried out, questions still persist as
to what is the appropriate human rights standard and also how should a human rights standard be
implemented in the context of a specific project. This article seeks to provide an institutional solu-
tion as an answer to these outstanding questions—the creation of a United Nations-based Human
Rights Unit for infrastructure projects that will set standards for projects and monitor compliance
with those standards.
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I. Introduction
As the planning for South America’s largest natural gas project1, the Camisea 
Project, in Peru progressed, meanwhile at over fifty universities in the United 
States students were holding demonstrations to protest the involvement of 
Citigroup, the commercial and investment bank, in this and other infrastructure 
projects.2  Natural gas extraction and distribution was a surprising lightning rod 
for non-violent action.  However, perhaps the alleged potential negative impact of 
the project on the rainforest and indigenous groups of the region goes some way 
to explain things.  Such protests were a part of a larger movement to target public 
and private financial institutions involved in financing infrastructure projects.3
This and other protests targeting the Camisea Project have succeeded in eliciting 
concessions and policy changes by the major players who underwrite and 
participate in the project.  However, despite successes and mutual agreements 
between protesters and project planners about how an infrastructure project 
should be carried out, questions still persist as to what is the appropriate human 
rights standard and also how should a human rights standard be implemented in 
the context of a specific project.  This article seeks to provide an institutional 
solution as an answer to these outstanding questions—the creation of a United 
Nations (Hereinafter ‘UN’)-based Human Rights Unit (Hereinafter ‘HRU’) for 
infrastructure projects that will set standards for projects and monitor compliance 
with those standards.  
While these social movements excel at pointing out the shortcomings of 
projects and spurring policy changes by project sponsors, oftentimes questions 
persist as to whether the measures adopted by project planners actually alleviate 
the human rights problems.  This leads in the Camisea case as elsewhere into an 
ongoing and often very public tug-of-war between social movements, on the one 
hand, and companies and governments, on the other.  These tug-of-wars are often 
antagonistic and involve the reputations of all parties involved.  At the end of the 
1
 “Modern El Dorado Emerges” 17(7) Business Korea 62, 63 (July 2000) 
2
 “Environmentalist, Students and Human Rights Advocates Confront Citigroup as Number One 
Funder of Global Warming” (7/11/01) archived at 
www.ran.org/news/newsitem.php?id=453&area=finance viewed on 12/2/03 
3 See Michael B. Likosky “Editor’s Introduction: Privatising Development: Global Project Finance 
Law and Human Rights” in Michael B. Likosky, ed., Privatising Development: Transnational 
Law, Infrastructure and Human Rights (forthcoming).  See also Alan Dabbs and Matthew Bateson 
“The Corporate Impact of Addressing Social Issues: A Financial Case Study of a Project in Peru” 
76 Environmental Monitoring and Assessment 135, 141 (2002).  On the involvement of banks in 
projects see Michael B. Likosky “Mitigating Human Rights Risks Under State-Financed and 
Privatized Infrastructure Projects” 10(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 65, 67 (2003) 
and MB Likosky “Editor’s introduction: transnational law in the context of power disparities” in 
Michael B. Likosky, ed, Transnational Legal Processes at xvii, xxiv (2002)
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day, quite often all parties are frustrated.  Community groups and non-
governmental organisations (Hereinafter ‘NGOs’) claim that project planners 
have not gone far enough to safeguard human rights, while project planners 
complain that they continue to be targets for human rights groups even after 
making a good faith effort to incorporate demands into the project matrix.  At the 
end of the day, social movements feel that their policy recommendations are 
poorly implemented and project planners wonder what more they could do to 
satisfy demands.
This article addresses this quandary.  Essentially, a consensus does not 
exist over what is an accurate assessment of the human rights risks associated 
with projects and also what is a reasonable means of incorporating measures into 
the project that will make it a human rights-friendly project.  It is argued here that 
the solution to the problem is to create a HRU under the umbrella of the UN.  To 
do so, this article will first sketch the contours of the HRU.  Its institutional form, 
goals and the problems that it might solve are discussed.  Next, a case study of the 
Camisea Project is presented in order to demonstrate how the HRU might offer a 
solution in the context of a specific ongoing infrastructure project.  Here, attention 
will be paid to the project history, the laws of the project and then the human 
rights risk assessment strategies and mitigation measures associated with the 
project.  In conclusion, a number of observations are made regarding how the 
HRU might be modelled in light of the case study findings.  Importantly, this 
article concerns itself primarily with infrastructure projects that are either 
privatised or else include a substantial private element.  Thus, World Bank-
financed projects are outside the scope of this article.  At the same time, World 
Bank projects might submit themselves to the proposed HRU.
II.  Towards a HRU
Presently, a movement is underway in international law to have human rights 
universally recognised with remedies transnationally-available.  Notable examples 
of advocacy for this trend may be found in the work of Anne-Marie Slaughter and 
David Boscoe and also of Harold Koh.  Slaughter and Boscoe have, for instance, 
advocated the pursuit of ‘plaintiff’s diplomacy’ as a means of using the courts to 
have human rights abuses committed abroad recognised domestically.4  While 
they focus on a number of categories of ‘plaintiff’s diplomacy’, most relevant for 
our purposes are those cases brought in the home state of transnational 
corporations alleging that these companies are engaged in abuses abroad.  
4
 Anne-Marie Slaughter and David Boscoe, “Plaintiff’s Diplomacy” 79 Foreign Affairs 102 
(2000).  For a discussion of ‘plaintiff’s diplomacy’ in the context of infrastructure projects, see 
Michael B. Likosky, “Mitigating Human Rights Risks Under State-Financed and Privatized 
Infrastructure Projects” 10(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 65, 70-71 (2003).
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Examples of such cases are those ones brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act 
of the United States.5  Similarly, Harold Koh refers to the broader trend of which 
‘plaintiff’s diplomacy’ is a part as ‘transnational public law litigation’ or ‘attempts 
to vindicate public rights and values through judicial remedies’.6  While 
‘plaintiff’s diplomacy and ‘transnational public law litigation’ focus on the use of 
courts to spur transnational corporations to respect the human rights of project-
affected communities, this article focuses instead on an extra-judicial, institutional 
solution to the alleged problem of a real world gap between stated commitment to 
human rights and actual respect for human rights.  Specifically, it offers an 
institutional solution to the problem of an alleged lack of respect for human rights 
by major infrastructure projects globally.  This solution is the HRU.  It is in line 
with the proposal by Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss to create an independent 
and democratically accountable extra-state, non-judicial institution of global 
governance in the United Nations.7
Projects like the Camisea gas pipeline suggest the need for an independent 
HRU to set standards for international infrastructure projects in the area of human 
rights and then to monitor compliance by projects with these standards.  This task 
is not an entirely straightforward one as standard setting and compliance are often 
processes and it is often difficult to assess the adequacy of processes.  For 
instance, project planners might seek to respect the human rights of indigenous 
groups by including representatives of a group in the decision-making processes 
of the project.  If so, the next question would be what constitutes ‘inclusion’.  
Also, does the indigenous group representative participate in all or select meetings 
and which ones?  Does the indigenous group hold voting rights at important 
planning meetings?  In other words, what type of involvement rises to the level of 
‘respect for human rights’?  At present NGOs are becoming increasingly adept at 
targeting project participants for reform, setting new benchmarks for their 
behaviour in projects.  However, although written commitment to high human 
5 Id at 103 and 107.  On the Alien Tort Claim Act see e.g. Annie-Marie Burley, “The Alien Tort 
Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor” 83 American Journal of International 
Law 461 (1989); Richard L. Herz, “Litigating Environmental Abuses Under the Alien Tort Claims 
Act” 40 Virginia Journal of International Law 545 (2000).  For high profile cases see e.g. Doe v. 
Unocal Corp., Case No. C99-2506 (N.D. Cal.); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 226 F.3d 88 (2d 
Cir. 2000); Jota v. Texaco Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998); and Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 
2000 WL 1225787 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
6
 Harold Hongju Koh, “Transnational Public Law Litigation” 100 Yale Law Journal 2347 (1991)
7
 Richard A. Falk and Andrew Strauss “Globalization Needs a Dose of Democracy” International 
Herald Tribune 5/10/99 at 8; Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss “On the Creation of a Global 
Peoples Assembly: Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty” 36 Stanford Journal of 
International Law 191 (2000); and Andrew L. Strauss “SYMPOSIUM: RE-FRAMING 
INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: Overcoming the Dysfunction of the 
Bifurcated Global System: The Promise of A Peoples Assembly” 9 Transnational Law and 
Contemporary Problems 489 (1999)
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rights aspirations is increasingly the norm, far too little attention is paid to 
translating this commitment into actual respect for human rights on the ground.
To remedy this deficiency, this article argues for the establishment of a 
HRU under the auspices of the UN.  The UN parentage would capitalise on the 
UN’s ability to act as a moral force for companies wishing to pursue human 
rights-respecting projects.  This role of the UN can be seen in the work of the 
International Labor Organisation, the World Bank, the UN Centre on 
Transnational Corporations and the UN Global Compact.8  With the notable 
exception of the inclusion of resettlement programmes in World Bank-financed 
projects9 and several other Bank initiatives, these UN efforts remain largely 
aspirational.  This character has led commentators to focus on using the UN to 
institute compliance with Codes of Conduct.  Realising this criticism of the UN 
efforts to ensure that transnational corporations implement human rights, the HRU 
would not only set standards for human rights respecting infrastructure projects, it 
would also include an institutional apparatus that is capable of monitoring 
compliance.  In effect, standards would be scrutinised and processes assessed. 
The HRU would be composed of a number of classes of actors.  The goals 
are to have its membership reflect roughly the stakeholders in a typical 
infrastructure project.  Thus, the HRU would draw its membership from NGOs, 
transnational corporations, international banks, community groups, governments 
from industrialised and developing countries as well as less interested parties such 
as UN bureaucrats and academics.  At present, these groups are unevenly 
represented within projects.  For instance, NGOs and community groups are 
generally invited only at certain stages of a project to participate in official project 
planning.  So, they are not insider participants throughout.  As a result, decisions 
affecting their interests are made without meaningful participation and 
consultation.  To ensure that the HRU does not come to represent a set political 
perspective, membership would rotate over time.  Further, if the organisation to 
which a member of the HRU becomes involved in a project under evaluation, then 
that member must recuse her or himself.
The instituting of a UN HRU would centralise what is at present an often 
disorganised and motley means of assessing and monitoring compliance with 
human rights standards.  For instance, at present public banks that finance projects 
may attach human rights conditions on their money.  They typically have their 
own way of setting standards and monitoring compliance.  Simultaneously, 
project planners might set different standards and monitoring mechanisms.  What 
results are parallel and overlapping efforts that are not always mutually 
8 See Michael B. Likosky “Mitigating Human Rights Risks Under State-Financed and Privatized 
Infrastructure Projects” 10(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 65, 67 (2003).
9
 Michael M. Cernea and Christopher McDowell, eds, Risks and Reconstruction: Experiences of 
Resettlers and Refugees (2000)
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reinforcing.  Further, this overstretches the capacities of community groups and 
NGOs which are often de facto monitors of the human rights standard-setting and 
implementation of projects.  This results often in shaming without necessarily 
producing desired outcomes.
The HRU’s remit would be fairly broad, i.e. setting human rights 
standards for and monitoring compliance with them for infrastructure projects that 
are public, private and mixed.  It would handle projects across economic sector, 
ranging from roads to airports to pipelines.  The HRU would also be involved in 
projects at every stage from planning, building and operation.  When certain types 
of human rights are at issue, it might require the translation of the model, 
‘impoverishment risks and reconstruction model for resettling displaced 
populations’, developed by Michael M. Cernea from World Bank projects to 
privatised infrastructure projects.10  A tendency might exist to broaden the remit 
to include non-infrastructure-based commercial activity such as the retail sector; 
however, the infrastructure project speciality is already a large challenge.  In 
concerning itself with private sector corporate activity, the HRU will build upon 
the experience of the UN Global Compact11. 
As is the case with the UN Global Compact, if a project is submitted to the 
HRU, then upon the necessary scrutiny, if successful, the company will receive a 
retractable UN Seal of Compliance.  This Seal would be modelled upon the 
Global Compact which is available to companies demonstrating respect for 
human rights.  However, the standard for the Seal from the HRU would be higher 
than the Global Compact.  It would not only require a pledge to respect human 
rights from the company; it would also require the submission of specific projects 
to the monitoring arm of the HRU.  In many cases this submission might present a 
substantial commitment.
Like retail companies, many of the major players in the infrastructure field 
face problems of reputational risk.  Oftentimes, in major infrastructure projects, 
10
 Michael M. Cernea ‘Risks, Safeguards, and Reconstruction: A Model for Population 
Displacement and Resettlement’ in Cernea and McDowell, supra note --, 11-55.
11 See http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Portal/Default.asp; Ambassador Betty King 
“SYMPOSIUM: The UN Global Compact: Responsibility for Human Rights, Labor Relations, and 
the Environment in Developing Nations” 34 Cornell International Law Journal 481 (2001); 
William H. Meyer and Boyka Stefanova “SYMPOSIUM: Human Rights, the UN Global Compact, 
and Global Governance” 34 Cornell International Law Journal 501 (2001); Meaghan Shaughnessy 
“Human Rights and the Environment: The United Nations Global Compact and the Continuing 
Debate About the Effectiveness of Corporate Voluntary Codes of Conduct” 2000 Colorado 
Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 159 (2000); Lee A. Tavis “Novartis and 
the U.N. Global Compact Initiative” 36 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 735 (2003); 
Alexis M. Taylor “UN REPORTS: The UN and the Global Compact” 17 New York Law School 
Journal of Human Rights 975 (2001); Aurora Voiculescu ‘Privatising Human Rights: Corporate 
Codes of Conduct between Standards, Guidelines and the Global Compact’ in L Williams, ed, 
Poverty and Law: Towards an International Law on Poverty (2003)
5
Likosky: Adapting Human Rights
Brought to you by | School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/25/19 1:28 PM
elite banks such as Chase Manhattan, Citigroup and Morgan Stanley are involved 
in financing infrastructure projects.  Similarly infrastructure companies such as 
Bechtel, Shell and Mobil are also increasingly recognisable to the average 
consumer.  Further, some of these companies not only are involved in extraction, 
but they are at times involved in retail.  The Seal from the HRU would be 
important in diminishing reputational risk.  Increasingly, banks and larger 
companies are acknowledging the need to respect human rights in the course of an 
infrastructure project.  In many ways, these companies are most vulnerable to 
questions concerning their commitment to human rights, because they have large 
reputational risk since their brand names are global.  At the same time, 
infrastructure projects come in various shapes and sizes and often do not involve 
companies that are household names.
The carrying out of infrastructure projects almost always involves 
numerous medium- and small-sized companies.  This is true whether a brand 
name infrastructure company takes the lead or else if such a company is not 
involved in the project at all.  With regard to the former, infrastructure projects 
typically have a large number of subcontractors.  Making sure that these 
subcontractors abide by human rights commitments might usefully fall upon the 
contracting party.  This would ensure a point of contact and also the involvement 
of a party with reputational risk.  However, infrastructure projects may be carried 
out by a consortium of companies that do not have retail arms and are thus not 
brand name companies.  How does one then ensure that human rights are 
respected by such projects?
The ability to ensure that human rights are respected in the context of 
infrastructure projects wherein a brand name company is not involved as a 
contractor is through the state.  Typically, states are lenders of last resort in 
infrastructure projects.  In other words, if an infrastructure project goes belly-up, 
it is typically the state that suffers most.  The state in certain cases may end up 
buying-out the private participants.  Also, it is the state that often requires an 
infrastructure project to be undertaken as a part of a larger development strategy.  
So, in these cases it is in the interest of the state that the infrastructure project is 
carried out in a sustainable way.  Thus, where a brand name infrastructure 
company is not involved in a project, it might be the state that liases with the 
HRU.
In order to explore further how the HRU might function in practice and 
how it might solve real world problems in the context of infrastructure projects, it 
is useful to examine a specific case study—the Camisea Project in Peru.  After 
discussing how human rights risks have been assessed and mitigated in the 
context of the Camisea Project, we will then return to the HRU to discuss how it 
might help solve some of the human rights problems that the Camisea Project 
faces.
6
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III.  The Camisea Project
A.  History of the Project
The Camisea Project is now almost twenty-five years old.  When an agreement 
was signed with Shell and Mobil to exploit the reserves,12 then Peruvian President 
Alberto Fujimori called the project the “deal of the century”.13  If the project 
fulfilled expectations, it would make the country a net exporter of hydrocarbons.14
Gas was first discovered in 198015 by Royal Dutch Shell.16  In 1981 Shell signed 
an exploration contract with Peru for Blocks 38 and 42 in the Ucagali Basin.  
From 1984 to 1986, Shell drilled five wells.17  In May of 1999 Shell and its 
partner Mobil pulled out of the project.18  The relationship between Shell and the 
Peruvian government had been, throughout Shell’s involvement in the project, 
spotty and stilted with Shell pulling out of the project more than once.19  When 
Shell and its then partner Mobil finally backed out of the project it was due to 
disagreements with the Peruvian government over distribution, prices and the 
export of gas.20  At that time, Shell had already spent two hundred and fifty 
million dollars on the project.21
When Shell and Mobil departed from the project, the government set up 
the Camisea Committee charged with identifying future investors in the project.22
This Committee went on road shows to Asia, Europe, the US and Canada to 
promote the project.23  What resulted is the project as it presently stands 
12
 Shell held a fifty-seven point five per cent stake in the venture.  “Mobil, Royal Dutch Quit 
Project in Peru to Supply Natural Gas” Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition) 1 17/7/98 
13
 Jane Holligan “Stoking Demand” The Economist Intelligence Unit 12/1/98
14
 Bob Williams “Camisea project transforming Peru into major regional gas player” 100(48) Oil 
and Gas Journal 20 (25/11/02)
15
 “Lifting Local Power” Latin Finance, March 2002.
16
 “Pluspetrol-led group wins Camisea Contract” 98(8) Oil and Gas Journal 26 (21/2/00)
17
 Maria Kielmas “Seeking investors for gas exploration” 66(9) Petroleum Economist 35
18
 “Pluspetrol-led group wins Camisea contract” 98(8) Oil and Gas Journal 26 (21/2/00)
19
 “Lifting Local Power” Latin Finance March 2002.  In 1988, for instance, Shell and its then 
partner Mobil pulled out “after failing to reach terms with the government for gas pricing and 
distribution.” Id.
20
 “The Americas: Seismic shock from Camisea” 348(8078) The Economist 35 (25/7/1998)
21
 “Mobil, Royal Dutch Quit Project in Peru to Supply Natural Gas” Wall Street Journal (Eastern 
Edition) 1 17/7/98
22
 “Pluspetrol-led group wins Camisea contract” 98(8) Oil and Gas Journal 26 (21/2/00)
23
 “Peru’s Camisea tender process to continue” 97(25) Oil and Gas Journal 30 21/6/99 and German 
Barrios “Why Camisea is Feasible Today” NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas 
(2000)
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comprised of three parts and spearheaded by two consortia already contracted to 
exploit and distribute reserves.
B.  The Project at Present
The Camisea Project as it presently stands is divided into three parts; the 
extraction and production of the gas fields, the transportation and distribution of 
the gas to Lima (350 miles southeast of the fields24) and also the distribution of 
gas from the capital city.25  In total, it is estimated that the fields contain “eleven 
trillion feet of natural gas and six hundred million barrels of condensate.”26  The 
gas will be produced by a consortium of companies, including, Pluspetrol Peru 
Corporation, S.A., Hunt Oil Company, SK Corporation and Tecpetrol SA.  The 
distribution of the gas to Lima will be carried out by another consortium, 
including Tecgas N.V., Pluspetrol Resources Corporation, Hunt Oil Company, SK 
Corporation, Sonatrach Petroleum Corporation B.V.I. and Grana y Montero S.A.27
The Project consists of two pipelines: one for natural gas and the other for liquid 
natural gas.28  Gas will first be consumed in Lima and then distributed nationally 
and perhaps internationally. 29
The Project will be regulated under The Law for the Promotion and 
Development of the Natural Gas Industry.  The Peruvian Energy Tariffs 
Commission will charge tariffs at point of sale and also for the distribution of gas.  
The government has also promised to provide guaranteed use of natural gas 
during the period for which sunk costs are recovered by companies.30  The law 
firm of Sullivan and Cromwell is representing the upstream and downstream 
consortia.31
Consortium companies will carry out their work both through concession 
contracts and build-operate-transfer (Hereinafter “BOT”) contracts.32  The 
advantage of the latter type of contractual arrangement is that companies can be 
sure to recoup sunk costs and capture an agreed upon profit.  The concession 
option is for a fixed number of years and thus a company may or may not have 
fully recouped costs and captured a reasonable profit.  However, in this case, as 
24
 Peggy Williams, “International Highlights” 1819 Oil and Gas Investor 90 (9/98)
25
 Larry Luxner “Bloom is off Mining, Energy Sector in Peru” Journal of Commerce 9A (10/9/98)
26
 Peggy Williams “International Highlights” 1819 Oil and Gas Investor 90 (9/98)
27
 “Camisea Project” www.camisea.com.pe viewed on 12/2/04
28
 “Camisea Project: Public Participation and Consultation Process: Summary and State of the 
Project” 7 (10/02)
29
 Id
30
 “Natural Gas Rules for Camisea  Project Set” 97(39) Oil and Gas Journal 30 (27/9/99)
31
 www.sullcrom.com/display.asp?section_id=15 viewed on 15/12/03
32
 On BOT projects see eg David A. Levy BOT and Public Procurement: A Conceptual 
Framework, 7 Indiana International and Comparative Law Journal 95 (1996)
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the government has committed itself to purchasing a fixed amount of gas during 
the recoup stage, the risk is mitigated.
The Camisea Project involves the extraction of gas in the Nahua-
Kugapakori Reserve which is a home to a number of indigenous groups.33  In fact 
three quarters of the project is located in the Reserve.34  Specifically, the Nahua, 
Kirineri, Nanti, Marhiguenga and Yine live in the Reserve.35  Since the time of 
Shell to present-day, tension has existed over how the human rights of these 
communities will be safeguarded.  Strategies to protect human rights have been 
pursued by community groups, NGOs, governments and companies.
C.  Human Rights Strategies by NGOs and Community Groups
Community groups and NGOs have pursued a number of different strategies to 
have human rights concerns recognised by project planners and incorporated into 
the project matrix itself.  The successes of these strategies are difficult to 
objectively assess.  However, it appears that some of them have accomplished 
their goals, while others remain frustrated.  Here, a number of strategies and 
campaigns will be detailed and, to a limited extent, assessed.
Infrastructure projects with a significant element of risk involved often 
receive funding from public banks, such as export credit agencies and 
development banks.  These banks may guarantee private loans, issue their own 
loans or insure projects against political risks associated with them.  In the case of 
Camisea, money was sought from both export credit agencies and the Inter-
American Development Bank.36  NGOs devised strategies to target both.
US consortium participants sought loans from the Export-Import Bank of 
the United States of America.  Specifically, companies asked for two hundred and 
fourteen point six million dollars in loans.37  A number of NGOs, including 
Amazon Watch Friends of the Earth, The Bank Information Center, 
Environmental Defence, Amazon Alliance and the Institute for Policy Studies 
33
 The Reserve was established by Ministerial Resolution No. 00046-90-AG/DGRAAR 14/2/1990
34
 “Execs, enviros tussle over financing of Peru Project” 28/6/02 archived at 
www.ran.org/news/newsitem.php?id=5542=finance
35
 Andrew Grumbel “Bush, the rainforest and a gas pipeline to enrich his friends” 30/7/03 London 
Independent archived at www.ran.org/news/newsitem.php?id=770&area=finance 
36
 Money was also sought successfully from the Andean Development Bank.  “Camisea IDB Loan 
Approved: Ex-Im denies other loan” 101(35) Oil and Gas Journal 37.  The Andean Development 
Bank approved seventy-five million dollars in loans.  Luisa Palacios “Latin America Update” 
JBIC (16/9/03)
37
 Tom Ichnoiowski “Ex-Im Bank Denies Aid for Peru Gas Project” 25(10) Engineering News 
Round 1 (9/8/03)
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targeted the Export-Import Bank, attempting to influence the Bank to deny 
funding.38
The NGOs involved used two strategies.  First, NGOs detailed the human 
rights and environmental problems of the project.  Second, they identified the 
political linkages between company executives and the current presidential 
administration.  For instance, they indicated that Ray Hunt, who was the chairman 
of the consortium company Hunt Oil had fundraised one hundred thousand dollars 
for the present administration.  In response to this campaign and based on their 
own assessment, the Export-Import Bank declined to fund the Camisea Project.39
At the same time, despite the success with the Export-Import Bank, companies 
sought financing from alternative means, including the export credit agencies of 
other countries, importing equipment instead from Germany and Italy.40  Also, 
consortium companies sought funding from the Inter-American Development 
Bank, leading to further NGO campaigns targeting the Bank.
When consortium companies sought financing from the Inter-American 
Development Bank, there was some question as to how the U.S. government 
would respond.  The U.S. government had denied funding through the Export-
Import Bank; however, it was now faced with a decision on the same project, 
except in a different institutional forum.  The U.S. held a thirty per cent voting 
share and veto rights in the Inter-American Development Bank.41  At issue were 
two loans, one was a seventy-five million dollar direct loan and the other sixty 
million dollars in privately syndicated loans.42  NGOs launched a campaign to 
persuade the Inter-American Development Bank to refuse financing for the 
project.  The results of this campaign differed from the campaign targeting the 
Export-Import Bank.
Initially, the NGO campaign succeeded in delaying a decision by the Inter-
American Development Bank.43  The lobbying of the Bank was, however, 
difficult as the Bank does not have a formal public consultation process.  NGOs, 
specifically the Institute for Policy Studies, the Bank Information Center, Friends 
38
 “Financing for Peru’s Camisea Project Voted Down by U.S. Ex-Im Bank: US Agency 
Applauded for Upholding Indigenouse and Environmental Safeguards in Controversial Amazon 
Energy Project” www.bicusa.org/lac/camisea_project_page.htm (28/8/03) viewed on 10/12/03.
39
 “Ex-Im Declines Financing Request to Bank Peru’s Camisea Gas Development Project” 
www.exim.gov/pressrelease.cfm/49A5YDF9-A3ED-883F.OCB97EKDBF5423/ (28/8/03) viewed 
on 10/12/03 & “Sonatrach Buys Pluspetrol’s Share in Camisea Project” 101(35) Oil and Gas 
Journal 37 (15/9/03)
40
 “Sonatrach Buys Pluspetrol’s Share in Camisea Project” 101(35) Oil and Gas Journal 37 
(15/9/03)
41
 Tom Ichnoiowsi “Big Peru Gas Project Gets Lift from Multilateral Bank Loan” 251(12) 
Engineering News Round 17 (22/9/03).
42
 “World Watch” Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition) 11 (6/8/03)
43
 Jay Griffiths “Progress is a Four-Letter Word: Sometimes Even Pipe Dreams Come True” The 
Ecologist (10/03); “Gas for Peru v. Green Imperialism” 368(8336) Economist 28 (8/9/03)
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of the Earth, Environmental Defense and Amazon Watch, pointed out that this 
lack of public consultation existed even though a 1996 Position Paper 
commissioned by the Bank had recommended that one be instituted.44
Ultimately, the Inter-American Development Bank agreed the loans on 
September tenth of 2003.45  The U.S. abstained from voting on the project.  As a 
member of the Board of Directors of the Bank, the U.S. could have vetoed the 
project.  Although the U.S. had declined to fund the project through the Export-
Import Bank, Jose A. Fourquet the U.S. representative to the Inter-American 
Development Bank, abstained from voting for rather than vetoed the project.  
Fourquet gave two grounds for the abstention:  first, private financing would be 
available for the project.  Second, Fourquet argued that the U.S. had “not been 
able to allay doubts about the adequacy of the environmental assessment 
conducted for the project.”46  The decision by the U.S. government to abstain 
from voting on the Camisea financing drew criticism both from NGOs and also 
U.S. Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi.  
Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi argued that the U.S. government should 
have voted against the issuing of loans by the Inter-American Development Bank.  
Specifically, Pelosi cited to the Pelosi Amendment of the International 
Development and Finance Act 1989.  This Act prevents the U.S. from supporting 
projects in the Inter-American Development Bank with “significant impact on the 
environment unless an environmental assessment is made publicly available.”47
Pelosi also referenced the human rights of indigenous peoples as a concern.48
Although the Inter-American Development Bank did agree to fund the 
Project, it did appear to make a concession to NGOs.  Specifically, the Bank made 
its loan conditioned upon the inclusion of measures intended to safeguard human 
rights and to protect the environment.  For instance, the Bank gave “Peru a five 
million dollar ‘institution-building’ loan to help police the Camisea Project, and 
44
 “Institute for Policy Studies and Amazon Watch: Evaluation: The Inter-American Development 
Bank’s Public Consultation on the Camisea Project” 
www.bicusa.org/lac/camisea_consulation_evaluation.htm (12/8/02) viewed on 10/12/03
45
 Jay Griffiths “Progress is a Four-Letter Word: Sometimes Even Pipe Dreams Come True” The 
Ecologist (10/03); “Gas for Peru v. Green Imperialism” 368(8336) Economist 28 (8/9/03)
46
 Tom Ichniowski “Big Peru Project Gets Lift from Multilateral Bank Loan” 251(12) Engineering 
News Record 17 (22/9/03)
47
 “Pelosi Statement on Camisea Project in Peru” From the Office of Congresswoman Nancy 
Pelosi, San Francisco, California, 8th District, 
www.house.gov/pelosi/press/releasses/sept03/p_camiseapipeline09/0003.htm (10/9/03) viewed on 
15/12/03
48
 Id.  Also, “USAID recommended that the U.S. Treasury Department Not Fund Camisea and 
Overseas Private Investment Corp. declined funding.”  Senator Patrick Leahy “Letter to the Editor 
of the Economist www.bicusa.org/lac/camisea/leahy_letter.htm/  (23/8/03) viewed on 10/12/03
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proposes to finance parallel monitoring by local groups.”49  The Inter-American 
Development Bank went further, requiring:
the development and implementation of environmental, social, health and 
safety, and contingency plans, procedures and systems, in form and 
content acceptable to the IDB; use of independent environmental and 
social consultants to monitor the entire Camisea Project, as well as 
company, governmental and community monitoring consultants to 
monitor the entire Camisea Project, ongoing reporting and monitoring by 
the companies to the IDB and project stakeholders; and specific financial 
mechanisms to ensure compliance with environmental and social 
requirements.50
So, the whilst the Inter-American Development Bank did approve the project with 
reservations regarding the environmental and human rights risks, it did require 
project planners to implement certain measures to mitigate these risks.  
Interestingly, while the decision to finance the project was criticised by NGOs, 
little attention was paid to whether the standards required by the Inter-American 
Development Bank were tailored to the project and of an appropriate level.  
Further, processes of monitoring compliance were not discussed at the time.
NGOs have, however, monitored compliance with human rights standards 
in various ways.  For instance, in August of 2002 NGO representatives from 
Amazon Watch, the Institute for Policy Studies, CEADES, OICH , Shina, and 
Serjal undertook a field mission to Peru.  These representatives reported alleged 
violations of worker codes of conduct, noted that contact had occurred with 
isolated indigenous groups, identified that no clear methodology for calculating 
compensation existed, indicated that no system of monitoring was in place and 
also that no independent system was in place for responding to local 
communities’ concerns.  In fact, an argument was made that consortium 
companies had undermined parallel-monitoring efforts.  The findings of this 
mission were written up in the form of a report. 51  It is unclear what effect this 
report has had on human rights policies.
In addition to the campaigns targeting public banks, as indicated in the 
Introduction of this article, NGOs targeted private banks.  Generally, NGOs 
sought to capitalise on the recent commitment to environmental protection and 
human rights by the leading investment banks.  A number of NGOs were involved 
49
 “Gas for Peru v. Green Imperialism” 368(8336) The Economist 28 (8/9/03)
50
 Inter-American Development Bank “Project Abstract: Camisea: Peru” at 4.
51
 “Report on the Social and Environmental Impacts of the Camisea Gas Project by the 
International Delegation to the Lower Urubamba” (8/02) archived at 
www.bicusa.org/lac/camisea_ngo_report_impacts.htm viewed on 10/12/03 
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in this campaign.  They hailed from a diverse set of countries, including, the 
United States, Italy, Germany, Finland, Belgium, Australia, Portugal, The 
Netherlands and Australia.  They included Rainforest Action Network, Campagna 
Perla Riforma della Banea Mondiale, The Berne Declaration, Greenpeace, Friends 
of the Earth, International Rivers Network, Urgewald e.u., Finnish ECA Reform 
Campaign, FERN, EURONatura, Mineral Policy Institute, World Economy, 
Ecology and Development, Quercus, Both Ends, Environmental Defense, Institute 
for Policy Studies, Friends of the Earth, The Corner House and The Wilderness 
Society.  These NGOs sent a letters to Equator banks urging them to withdraw 
financing from the Camisea project.  Letters were sent to an equally international 
group including banks from The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the U.S., 
France, Switzerland, Germany, Italy, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.  The 
banks were ABN AMRO, Barclays PLC, Citigroup, Credit Lyonnaise, Credit 
Suisse Group, Dresdner, Bank, HVB Group, ING Group, MCC, Rabobank Group, 
Royal Bank of Canada, The Royal Bank of Scotland, West LB AG and Westpac 
Banking Corporation.52  It is difficult to assess the impact of this campaign, as 
NGOs do not provide a sense of the extent of involvement of each bank and the 
human rights standards, if any, demanded on the project by these banks.
A particularly high profile campaign was launched against one of the 
Equator Banks—Citigroup.  NGOs used a variety of strategies to target Citigroup, 
including, an advertisement in the New York Times53, letters and student protests.  
These campaigns are part of the Equator Principles phenomenon which is a 
movement by investment banks, Equator Banks, to adopt human rights standards 
for privatised international infrastructure projects which they finance.54
A Report targeting the Peruvian state55 was also issued by a number of 
South American community groups.56  These groups argued that “[t]he 
52
 “Press Release: Camisea Project is Litmus Test for New Equator Principles: Environmental 
Allies Urge Banks to Uphold Commitments” 5/9/03 archived at 
www.ran.org/news/newsitem.php?id=807&area=finance viewed on 21/12/03
53
 “Citigroup will be target of negative ad by Rainforest Action Network” AFX News, 26/8/02 
archived at www.ran.org/news/newsitem.php?id=567&area=finance viewed on 21/12/03
54 See Michael B. Likosky, ed., Privatising Development: Transnational Law, Infrastructure 
Projects and Human Rights (forthcoming)
55
 “Position and Recommendations Presented by Various Peruvian Civil Society Organizations to 
the IADB, The Andean Development Corporation (CAF) and the Export-Import Bank” 2/7/03 
archived at www.bicusa.org/lac/camisea_ngo_position_nov02.htm at C2
56
 These groups included: Association for the Conservation of the Cutivireni Patrimony; Peruvian 
Association for Nature Conservation; ProHuman Rights Association; Center for the Development 
of Indigenous Amazonians; Peruvian College of Architects; Conservation International; Peruvian 
Committee of the World Union for Nature; National Coordinator of Rural Communities Affected 
by Mining; City for Life Forum; Ecological Forum; Peruvian Group for the Resolution of 
Conflicts; Oxfam America; Shinai Serjali; National Environmental Society; Peruvian Society for 
Environmental Law; Association for the Conservatino of the Peruvian Sea; World Wildlife 
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participation of civil society would not only improve the project’s content and 
proposals, but would also serve to strengthen the credibility and legitimacy of the 
decision-making process.”57
As well as NGO and community group campaigns, protests also took a 
more violent form with Shining Path allegedly responsible for the bombing of a 
Shell Oil office.58  On another occasion sixty pipeline workers were kidnapped.59
So an international group of NGOs and Peruvian civil society 
organisations have pursued a number of strategies targeting a range of actors in 
the hopes of having an effect on the human rights practices of the Camisea 
Project.  It is difficult to assess the impact of these efforts; however, some seemed 
to have achieved their objectives while others appear stillborn.  On the other side 
of the fence, project planners have also sought to mitigate human rights risks of 
the Camisea Project.  
D.  Human Rights Strategies by Project Sponsors and the Peruvian State
As indicated above, the Camisea Project has been underway for some time and 
has undergone a shift in the makeup of the project planners.  Since Shell and 
Mobil pursued the project for a number of years before the present consortium 
took over, it is useful to examine the measures taken to safeguard human rights by 
each group separately.  Also, it is important to note a key activity by the Peruvian 
state in safeguarding human rights.
1. Shell and Mobil and Human Rights
Shell and Mobil took a proactive and public stance to safeguard human rights.  
Alan Hunt, the General Manager of Shell Prospecting and Development, 
reinforced this point, saying, “we need criticism from the outside”60 and that its 
agreement with the government will reflect “a high level of sensitivity to social 
and environmental issues.”61  This position reflected a sign of the times.  Shell 
had been starkly criticised for its human rights practices, in particular the 
Foundation-Peru Program Office; Confderation of Amazonian Nationalities of Peru; Institute of 
the Commons; Machiguenga Council of the Urubamba River; Labou Civil Association; 
Management Committee for Sustainable Development of the Lower Urubamba; Racimos de 
Ungurahui.  Id
57
 Id at 9
58
 “Shell and Mobil Agree with Peru’s Oil Firm on Gas Exploration” Wall Street Journal (Eastern 
Edition) A8 20/5/96 
59
 Andrew Gumbel “Bush, the rainforest and a gas pipeline to enrich his friends” The Independent 
30/7/03 archived at www.ran.org/news/newsitem.php?id=770&area=finance  viewed on 2/12/03
60
 Pratap Chaterjee “Peru goes beneath the Shell” 18(5) Multinational Monitor at 14 5/97
61
 “World Class Peruvian Development” 224(10) Pipeline and Gas Journal 18 10/97
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campaign against Brent Spar and also its activities in Nigeria.62  As the Managing 
Director of Shell indicated, “'[t]his is a whole new approach.  . . . We know the 
eyes of the world are on us’”.63
Shell hired a Peruvian anthropologist Alonso Zarzar64 trained at 
Cambridge University to develop a plan for safeguarding the human rights of 
indigenous groups.65  Also, Shell hired an NGO, Natura USA, and a Peruvian 
community group, Red Ambiental Peruana.66
Shell adopted a number of measures designed to safeguard human rights.  
These have been detailed elsewhere67, so here a brief overview is provided.  First, 
Shell devised an “Off-shore” Policy.  This Policy prevented workers from leaving 
the site so as to prevent contact with isolated communities.  Second, a Health 
Passport Scheme was instituted to ensure vaccination of workers to prevent the 
spread of disease from and to local communities.  Third, a consultation 
programme was established including one-to-one meetings and workshops with 
local communities.  Fourth, a ‘No-road’ Commitment was instituted whereby 
planners avoided building roads so as to prevent exploitation of the area by 
outsiders.  Fifth, planners identified the optimal location for the gas plant, drilling 
and pipelines.  Sixth, hovercrafts were modified to prevent disruption to 
community-owned boat.  Seventh, long-term Social Capital and Biodiversity 
Programs were established to involve local communities in the project planning 
and to support local initiatives.  Eighth, planners devised a compensation 
programme that included a process of consultation and negotiation.  Ninth, an 
effort was made to establish a high standard for health, safety and the 
environment.68
Shell’s efforts were criticised by Amazon Watch which argued that there 
were “'gaps between rhetoric and reality’”.69  A Release by a number of 
indigenous groups went further, blaming Shell for specific violations of human 
rights.  These violations included the death through spread of disease of fifty-
percent of the population, an “unjust ‘negotiation’ process” and contact with
62
 “It’s not easy being green” 136(3) Fortune 124 4/8/97
63
 Id 
64
 Pratap Chaterjee “Peru goes beneath the Shell” 18(5) Multinational Monitor at 14 5/97
65
 Jonathan Friedad “Green Acres: Oil Companies Strive to Turn a New Leaf to Safe Rain 
Forest—Shell, Mobil Want to Avoid Raising Ire of Activists at Massive Peru Project—But 
Skeptics Wait and See” Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition) A1 17/7/97
66
 Id
67
 Alan Dabbs and Matthew Bateson “The Corporate Impact of Addressing Social Issues: A 
Financial Case Study of a Project in Peru” 76 Environmental Monitoring and Assessment 135 
(2002)
68
 Id
69
 Jonathan Friedad “Green Acres: Oil Companies Strive to Turn a New Leaf to Safe Rain 
Forest—Shell, Mobil Want to Avoid Raising Ire of Activists at Massive Peru Project—But 
Skeptics Wait and See” Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition) A1 17/7/97
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isolated groups.70  Regardless of the efficacy of Shell and Mobil’s actual 
practices, when the companies pulled out of the project, the landscape changed 
dramatically with attention shifting to the practices of consortia companies.
2.  The Consortia Companies
During the post-Shell period, policies to protect human rights have continued, 
albeit in a somewhat less public and less extensive fashion.  However, the 
consortia have definitely made a vocal commitment to human rights and have 
instituted practices in order to realise these goals.  Among the policies are:
• “Compliance with the socio-environmental legislation and with the 
Consortium Corporate Policy on Environment, Health and Safety
• Respect towards the Communities: ‘Good Neighbor Policy’
• Respect for property and land possession
• Collaboration with the Government of Peru to meet local needs—
Sustainable development
• Recognition of the high sensitivity and biodiversity”71
• The production of an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment
• The convening of public consultations72
The project planners’ public consultation process involved multiple stakeholders:
Over a period of four months the social team of ERM along with project 
engineers from Pluspetrol, were involved in a series of workshops in order 
to inform stakeholders about the project component, and receive their 
inquiries and concerns.  The process involves a broad sector of society, 
including local authorities, unions, church representatives, NGOs, 
universities, different groups of fisherman present in the area, and 
representatives form [sic] the Paracas National Reserve.  The consultations 
were, and are, conducted in the City of Pisco and the villages of San 
70
 Coordinator of Indigenous Organizations for the Amazon Basin, the Inter-Ethnic Association for 
the Development of the Amazon Rainforest, the Permanent Coordinator for Indigenous Peoples in 
Peru, The Matsiguenka Council for the Urubamba River, the Peruvian Communities Affected by 
Mining, The Regional Association of Indigenous Peoples of the Central Rainforest of Peru 
“Declaration by Indigenous Peoples in Defence of Life, Territory and the Environment: The 
Camisea Project is Threatening the Fundamental Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Damaging 
Fragile Ecosystems and Amazon Biodiversity” signed 25/8/03 archived at 
www.bicusa.org/iac/camisea_project_page.htm viewed on 10/12/03
71
 CAMISEA PROJECT: Public Participation and Consultation Process: Summary and State of the 
Project 11 (October 2002)
72
 Id at 29
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Andres y Paracas, and has [sic] not ended with the submission of the EIA, 
since it has been conceived as a continuous process.73
Also, in addition to these consultations, planners have established a 
Community Relations Program to evaluate the social impact of different stages of 
the project.  This Program will 
• Identify and involve the local population.
• Establish communication and participation channels.
• Identify the institutions (public and private) and organizations 
(national/regional/local).
• Establish contacts.
• Recurrent disclosure workshops.74
As well, the project will hire members of local communities.75
The project planners also devised a framework for compensating local 
communities.  A number of principles were set forth, including an agreement to 
make sure that compensation benefited the entire community; that dependence on 
the planners would be avoided; compensation would be “oriented towards 
improving the education, health, productive activities, training, communication, 
native communities’ organization and the role of women in the local economy”76, 
and that the community assemblies would legitimate the agreements.77
Compensation would be distributed directly to communities, although sometimes 
the NGO Pro-Naturaleza would be involved.78
An additional relevant policy adopted by the consortium is the Social 
Contingency Program.  This Program is designed to maintain the way of life of 
indigenous communities.  This programme involves understanding the local 
communities, gaining knowledge about how to communicate with these 
communities, devising rules to govern the interaction between communities and 
project workers, develop a protocol in case contact with isolated communities 
occurs and devise a plan for handling “difficult situations”.79  Related, a 
Community Relations Plan was instigated “to identify, understand and handle the 
social aspects related to the Project, minimize and/or eliminate potential negative 
73
 Id at 29-30
74
 Id at 32
75
 Id at 33
76
 Id at 34
77
 Id at 33-34.
78
 Id at 34
79
 Id at 35
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impact resulting from construction activities and increase the positive 
environmental impacts.”80
3.  The State
Although the activity of the state with regard to human rights has been somewhat 
less publicised, the state has created an ombudsman for the project.  The goal of 
the ombudsman is
to develop conflict-prevention activities between people, organizations 
and entities related to the development of the Camisea Project. Other 
functions will be to mediate, conciliate, or facilitate solutions in case of 
disagreement or conflicts related exclusively to the social and/or 
environmental aspects derived from the implementation and start up of the 
Camisea Project.81
How the ombudsman functions in practice has yet to be evaluated.
So, as the above attests, project planners, NGOs, community groups and 
governments in the context of the Camisea Project have hotly contested human 
rights standards and the implementation of these standards.  Next, this article
returns to the discussion of the UN HRU to evaluate how it might offer a solution 
to some of the real world problems raised by the Camisea Project and also how 
the HRU might be modelled in order to be a responsive institution.
IV.  The HRU Revisited: Concluding Observations
In sum, it has been argued here that a HRU should be created under the auspices 
of the UN.  The centralisation of authority to scrutinise human rights standards 
and to monitor compliance with them would solve many real world problems 
highlighted by the Camisea Project case study.  In this regard, a number of 
observations might be made.
First, oftentimes the motley nature of international law is one of its 
highlights; the fact that grievances might be adjudicated in multiple institutions 
and in different ways.  It is one of the attributes that transnational corporations 
like most.  However, in the case of Camisea and its human rights practices, 
standards emanating from a diverse range of sources and the monitoring of 
compliance from an equally diverse range, rather than being a cause for 
celebration, has resulted in a system in which tasks are often repeated with an 
80
 Id at 43
81
 “Camisea Project: Camisea Project Ombudsman” www.camisea.com.pe viewed on 12/2/03
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unevenness in quality.  Thus, a case may be made in this situation for the 
centralisation and rationalisation of authority.  This is where the HRU comes in.  
This lack of centralisation is exampled by the way in which the public 
banks function in practice.  In the Camisea case, a quick “race to the bottom” 
occurred.  The Export-Import Bank of the U.S. has the highest human rights 
standards of export credit agencies.  However, in practice, when the Export-
Import Bank denied funding, the U.S. government sanctioned funding by other 
means in the Inter-American Development Bank.  Also, the consortium itself 
simply imported its goods from another jurisdiction.  So lobbying pressure on the 
Export-Import Bank might have succeeded in the short run, but it was deficient in 
the long term.
Second, in the Camisea case, during the first phase of the project when 
Shell and Mobil were heading up things, it was possible for NGOs and 
community groups to capitalise on the reputational risk of those companies to 
push for the institutionalisation of human rights into the project.  However, with 
the shift away from brand-name companies to lesser-known ones, strategies have 
become less focused.  A HRU would ameliorate this problem by pressuring all 
projects to be scrutinised at the same level by the same institution.  As noted 
above, this could occur through pressuring the Peruvian state to submit the project 
to the HRU.  This would economise current strategies.
Third, as has been discussed, NGO campaigns in the Camisea Project 
focused on detailing the political connections of companies with financiers and 
also putting forth the human rights problems incurred by company projects and 
lawsuits against companies.82  While this is an important first step, it has led to 
denials of funding and setting of human rights standards at the aspirational level, 
rather than to the implementation of human rights norms in the context of the 
project itself.  Importantly though, the Inter-American Development Bank has 
taken steps in this regard.  The HRU would move the discourse towards the next 
level, away from reputation and towards results
Fourth, in the Camisea case study, the NGOs and community groups have 
been incorporated into the project planning after tendering and spottily during the 
construction phase.  Alan Dabbs and Matthew Bateson have argued for a need to 
involve these groups throughout the project:
stakeholders must have a clear understanding of all potential impacts and 
an opportunity to suggest mitigation measures before they can be expected 
82 See eg Amy Gray “BIC Letter to the IDB Board of Executive Directors, Camisea Project” 
(24/7/03) archived at www.bicusa.org/lac/camisea_amy_letter.htm viewed on 10/12/03
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to support a project83 . . .  Effective management of social issues requires a 
process to identify and incorporate those issues into the project.  This is an 
iterative process of consultation with key stakeholders so that the design, 
construction and operation of facilities are managed for the mutual benefit 
of the business and of the local society.84
A HRU would require that projects be submitted for scrutiny at the tender stage.  
This would ensure processes of inclusion at the onset of a project.  This would 
mitigate against the common practice in infrastructure projects identified by 
Dabbs and Bateson wherein, the “practice is to employ people to ‘sell the project’ 
or ‘clear the way’ for development without iterative consultation.  Then the 
company concentrates on ‘fire fighting’ any negative social consequences.”85
Thus, in the cases such as Camisea wherein indigenous groups are involved, the 
requirement of consultation by ILO Convention 169 would be met.86
Fifth, it is unclear whether the indigenous groups in the Camisea case have 
been fully included in project decision-making and also the extent to which they 
have been able to monitor the effect of decisions on their natural resources.  Laura 
Rival has argued that “[t]he success of the private sector’s model of equal 
partnership will depend on the sharing of control, and on how much training 
indigenous peoples receive to enable them to monitor and control exploitation of 
their natural resources.”87  As a part of its monitoring mechanism, the HRU would 
ensure training of indigenous groups.  Also, process-rights of these groups would 
be central to the functioning of the HRU.  Having an objective outside party 
working to this end would help to provide companies and indigenous groups with 
an idea of practices elsewhere.
Sixth, in the context of partially-privatised projects such as Camisea, often 
the state does not receive an appropriate level of scrutiny for its actions.  States 
maintain rights under the BOT scheme and the concession contract.  Not only are 
tariffs set, but projects will ultimately devolve into state hands.  In the Camisea 
Project, NGOs did not tend to target the state; although Peruvian civil society 
organisations did.  Peruvian civil society organisations argued for the 
83
 Alan Dabbs and Matthew Bateson “The Corporate Impact of Addressing Social Issues: A 
Financial Case Study of a Project in Peru” 76 Environmental Monitoring and Assessment 135, 137 
(2002)
84
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centralisation of monitoring with human rights standards under the auspices of the 
Peruvian state.  Specifically, they advocate:
The Peruvian Government, supported by a panel of internationally 
renowned experts and representatives of Peruvian civil society, should 
ensure the effectiveness, enforcement and integration of monitoring that is 
being carried out by the consortiua, OSINERG, IADB, and others.88
A HRU would provide a common end-game for the targeting of both public and 
private actors—the submission of the project to the HRU.
In conclusion, in a world in which infrastructure projects are increasingly 
privatised, it is necessary to retain some level of public scrutiny for their human 
rights practices.  The HRU would work with governments, companies, NGOs and 
community groups to ensure that human rights standards are set forth at the level 
of aspiration and also are translated into real world practices.  
88
 “Position and Recommendations Presented by Various Peruvian Civil Society Organizations to 
the IADB, The Andean Development Corporation (CAF) and the Export-Import Bank” 2/7/03 
archived at www.bicusa.org/lac/camisea_ngo_position_nov02.htm at 10
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